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ABS TRACT
Sex—related wage differentials are almost universal. Economists tradi-
tionally tend to attribute a major fraction of the differential to the
difference in on—the—job training. This difference is in turn often ex-
plained by the lower profitability of this investment for women who plan
to interrupt their careers for family reasons. An alternative explanation,
that women do not invest because of lack of investment opportunities owing
to employers' expectation that they will drop out of the market, has been
given little attention in the literature. The present paper tries to
ascertain, theoretically and empirically, the validity of this argument.
Employers have little stake in their employees' investment in general
human capital. Thus, if employers' decisions affect investment, this has
to be investment in firm—specific human capital. The paper explores the
way employers and employees share in such an investment and the way em-
ployers' conceptions about women's labor force attachment can affect the
size of the investment, women's wages, and their labor—force separation rate.
To test the hypothesis that employers' expectations affect women's
wages,Iexamine the effect of plans for labor—force separation on wages.
It is assumed that employers are not aware of individual plans, sothat
absenceof a plan's effect on wages can serve as prima facie evidence for
the hypothesis. In a simultaneous—equation system it is observed that
wages affect plans but plans do not affect wages. Further investigation
indicates that the skill intensity of jobs which men and women occupy is
a major determinant of the wage gap. This variable is very sensitive to
past performance (as measured by labor—force experience and tenure) and
future plans in the case of men, but is hardly affected at all by these
variables in the case of women.
Reuben Cronau
Department of Economics
The Hebrew University
Jerusalem,ISRAEL+ +
SEX-RELATEDWAGE DIFFERENTIALS ANDWOMEN'SINTERRUPTED
LABOR CAREERS--THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG*
The wage differential between men and women is a thorn in the side of
economists, theorists and empiricists alike. Theorists are by and large
at a loss to explain the persistence of such a wage gap in a competitive
environment, and empiricists are hard pressed to identify the factors
that explain it.In their seminal study of this problem Mincer and
Polachek (1974) identified on-the-job investment as the major culprit.
Women expect to drop out of the labor force when they have children, the
argument goes, and hence invest less in on-the-job training. Consequently,
they enjoy only moderate wage rises over their life cycle, so that the
wage gap widens with age. Mincer and Polachek argue that differences in
labor-force experience explain 70 percent of the hourly-earnings
differential between married men and women, but they also admit that
post-school investment on the job may be indirectly affected by earnings
differentials. In their words, "indirect effects occur in that the
existence of market discrimination discourages the degree of market
orientation in the expected allocation of time and diminishes incentives
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toinvestment in market-oriented human capital. Hence, the lesser job
investments and greater depreciation of female market earning power may
to some extent be affected by expectations of discrimination" (Mincer and
Polachek, 1974, p. S104).
This by now traditional explanation runs into some difficulties
when used to explain the persistence of the wage gap. The l960s and 1970s
have witnessed a continuous increase in the labor-force participation rate
of women (and in particular married women), a change accompanied by a
decline in the labor-force drop-out rate of married women with young
children. Nevertheless, there has been no obvious decline in the wage
gap (Fuchs, 1974; Oaxaca, 1977),1
In view of these difficulties, this study explores an alternative
hypothesis, which argues that the traditional explanation suffers from
reverse causality. Putting it informally, it is not that women do not
want to invest in their careers, but that they are not given adequate
opportunities to do so. Employers who expect women to drop out of the
labor force when they have children are reluctant to admit them to positions
that involve invesetment. Consequently, women are cofined to jobs which
promise little wage promotion. Once they have children, they do not (given
the nature of their job) find it worth while to stay in the labor force,
thus confirming their employers' expectations and creating a vicious circle
they cannot break.
This argument, often advanced by women, abounds with difficulties.
Of course, it can be argued that the increase in participation rates is
associated with a decline in the average labor-force experience of women
and that the average wage gap would have increased if that for the more
experienced women had not narrowed.+ -3- +
Ona formal level, wage increases are usually explained by investment in
general human capital, i.e., training that increases a person's producti-
vity regardless of where he is employed. However, in the absence of
binding labor contracts, this kind of training is fully financed by the
employee himself (in the form of wages which fall short of productivity
during the initial stages of the investment). Since employers do not
participate in this type of investment, it is not clear why they should
prefer men to women unless it is assumed that they are pure discriminators.
Any formalization of our argument must therefore rely on the invest-
ment in specific training. Specific training is defined as training that
increases a person's productivity only in the firm in which he was
trained. Given the uncertainty of future employment, the employee may be
reluctant to invest in this kind of training on his own (since he may be
fired at no cost to the employer), and so will be the employer (since the
employee may quit at no cost to himself). Consequently, this investment
will be undertaken only if employer and employee can reach some agreement
on how to share costs and returns.
The investment in specific training affects the slope of the age-
earnings profile inasmuch as the employee shares in the costs and reaps
part of the returns, and insofar as the investment in specific and general training
is a joint venture. When it is difficult to separate the specific and the
general elements in training, and the one cannot be acquired without the
other, the employer's reluctance to invest in his employee's specific
skills may prevent the latter from increasing his general skills.
To formalize this hypothesis, I present a formal model analysing the
sharing of costs and returns of the investment in specific training. The
general discussion is followed by a discussion of the specific case of+ -4- +
women:how do the employer's conceptions (or misconceptions) about women's
quit rate affect the sharing and overall size of the investment?
To confront this hypothesis with the traditional one, I examine the
effect on wages of planned labor—force quits. It is assumed that if a
woman plans to quit the labor force she has no reason to disclose her
plans to her employer. Thus, the intention to drop out of the labor force
will depress wages if women who plan to do so reduce their investment in
training. On the other hand, plans to quit should have no effect on wages
if access to training is controlled by an employer who has no knowledge of
the plans. The absence of any plans-to--quit effect on wages can therefore
serve as prima facie evidence for our hypothesis.
The relationship between wages and plans to quit is far from being a
simple one—way relationship. Plans may affect wages (through their effect
on investment in human capital), but lower wages may also induce quits.
One cannot expect, therefore, to detect the effect of plans on wages in a
simple one-way regression scheme. What is required is a simultaneous
scheme where plans are affected by wages and wages are affected by plans.
Estimating such a model, using panel data, reveals that it is lower wages
which encourage quits but that quits do not affect wages.
To test the sensitivity of the results to the specification of the
model, the model was expanded to incorporate on-the-job training directly.
I distinguish between investment in training and the training required for
the specific job (there is direct information on both variables in the
data of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics). Both variables
affect wages, and are (or might be) in turn affected by planned quits
(which depend on wages). The estimation of the four-equation model
reveals that there is no fundamental difference between men and women in+ -5-- +
thewage, labor-force separation, and on-the-job training equations (the
only major difference is in the sensitivity of quits to demographic changes
such as marriage, separation, children, and residential mobility). On the
other hand, the sex differences in the job-requirements equation are most
pronounced. On the average, women occupy jobs which require substantially
less training than men's jobs. They are concentrated in occupations which
involve less training, and within broad occupations they occupy positions
which need less training. Their experience in the labor force and with
the firm has much less weight in determining the quality of their jobs,
and their future plans (in sharp contrast to those of men) are not consi-
dered at all.
In evaluating these results, observe that when race, marital status,
union membership and some other variables are controlled for, women earn
rather less than three quarters of the men's hourly wage. The sex
differences in current training and job requirements explain about two-
thirds of this differential (i.e., if women had on-the-job training and
if they got jobs which require the same training as men's jobs, the wage
gap would shrink to 10 percent). The sex difference in labor-force
separations (which in turn is traced to the sex difference in the effect
of the demographic factors on separation) explains much of the difference
in training. It cannot, however, account for the difference in job
requirements. In particular, if men quit the labor force at the same rate
as women, if they had the same experience, tenure, and occupational
structure, they would have jobs that are substantially inferior (in terms
of training) to those they actually hold, and consequently much lower
wages. On the other hand, if women were to reduce their quit rate,
increase their labor-force experience and tenure, and change their+ —6-- +
occupationalcomposition, they would obtain only marginally better jobs,
and the wage gap would narrow by very little. What is required to close
the gap is a structural change. It is only if their observed characteristics
(e.g., labor-force experience and tenure) were given the same weight as
men's in the allocation of jobs by employers that women would have an
incentive to change their participation behavior and reduce their quit rates.
I. LABOR TURNOVER AND INVESTMENT IN SPECIFIC CAPITAL
Specific humancapitalhas traditionally been regarded as a major
determinant of labor turnover. The investment in skills which are
specific to the firm is an endeavor shared by employer and employee, each
being reluctant to undertake it on his own. The larger the investment,
the greater the stake of the two partners in the continuation of the
partnership, and hence the lower the labor turnover.
In this section the relationship between specific human capital and
labor turnover is formalized.I discuss the decline in job separation as
tenure increases, the effect of investment in specific human capital on
the age-earnings profile, the effect of the reservation wage on this
investment, and the role of the employer's conception of his employees'
career attachment.
The formal presentation is based on a recent model by Hashimoto (1979)
and incorporates some modifications by Carmichael (1981). Hashimoto sets
out to solve an old puzzle: how do employer and employee share the costs
and returns of the investment in specific human capital? The problem is
as old as the concept of specific human capital itself. It was Becker
(1962) who first posed the question: given that the returns to the
investment are conditional on the continuation of the employee's connection+ -7- +
withthe firm, and given the high cost of enforcing labor contracts, how
would each party secure its share in the returns when the other threatens
to sever the connection? Becker suggested that the two parties share in
the costs of the investment, so as to make breaking up the partnership
costly to both. However, he did not specify the rules which should govern
the allocation of costs and returns. It was later argued (Mortensen, 1978)
that these rules are immaterial if labor contracts can be renegotiated and
wage offers are matched whenever one of the parties threatens to sever the
relationship, or alternatively, when each party has to compensate the
other for damage caused by the break-up of the partnership.
Hashimoto addresses the question of what form the labor contract
takes when information on some aspects of the partnership is not shared
equally and is costly to convey. For example, the employee's productivity
is known to the employer but not (or only partly) to the employee, and
wage offers from outside (or, in Carmichael's formulation, job satisfac-
tion) are known to the employee but are costly to convey to the employer.
In this case, matching wage offers or ascertaining damages becomes very
costly (and the incentive for fraud very great) and one has to revert to
other ways of resolving the partnership problem. Hashimoto's solution,
which is defined within a two-period optimization scheme, involves a
pre-negotiated two-tier wage scheme: in the first period the employee
draws a wage which is lower than his marginal productivity (and the wage
he could get elsewhere) so as to pay for his share in the cost of the
investment; for the second period he is promised a wage which exceeds his
alternative wage (but falls short of his expected marginal productivity),
where the premium in excess of the alternative wage represents the
employee's share in the returns (the employer's share being the difference+ -8- +
between marginal productivity and the wage). The returns are shared so
as to maximize the overall benefits of the association. The wage rate,
which determines the apportionment of the benefits, is determined so that
the marginal gain to one party from a change in the share equals the
marginal loss to the other.
Formally, it is assumed that employer and employee are both risk
neutral. The investment in specific human capital takes place in the
first period at a cost C. The outcome of the investment process is
known only at the end of that period. The employer learns the employee's
productivity and the employee learns the amount of satisfaction (i.e.,
psychic income) he derives from the job. The employer decides to fire
the employee if his realized productivity falls short of the prenegotiated
wage, and the employee decides to quit when his total wage package (wage
plus job satisfaction) falls short of his reservation wage.
Let M denote the mean productivity of employees who have invested
in the firm-specific human capital, n., the random component in producti-
vity (varying from one person to the next) and W the prenegotiated wage;
the employee is fired if
He quits his job when
W+ 0< R
where 0 denotes job satisfaction and R the reservation wage.2 Let
2 It is assumed that riis known only to the employer and 0 only to
the employee so that W cannot be renegotiated in order to prevent or
reduce job separations if either of these inequalities holds.+ -9- +
f(n)and q(O) denote the density functions of the random components r
and 0, respectively. The probability of the employee being fired is
then
(1) F=F(W-M)=prob(n<W-M),
where F is the distribution function of r. Similarly, the probability
of a quit is
(2) Q =Q(R-W)=prob(0<R-
whereQ is the distribution function of 8. For simplicity it is assumed
that the mean values of r and 0 are zero and that they are uncorrelated,
E(ri) =E(0)=cov(,0) =0.
A wage-raise increases the employee's share of returns and reduces
the probability of his quitting but increases the risk of his being fired.
This risk may be reduced by reducing the wage but only at the expense of
an increase in the probability of quitting. The optimum wage rate is that
which maximizes the joint gains from the association. These gains (G)
can be reaped only if the association persists, and they are composed of
the gains in productivity and psychic income associated with the
investment,
(3) G =(1-F)(l-Q)[(M-R)+E(nln >W-M)+E(eI0>R-W)]
=(1-F)(l-Q)[(W
-M)+i0(R
-
whereu(Z) =E(z-ZIz>Z)denotes the expected residual (i.e., the
difference between the truncated mean and the truncation point) .The
In the notation used here, z =11or0, and Z =(W-M)or (R -+ -10- +
optimumwage satisfies the condition
(4) (W -M)A0(R
-W)= - W)X(W-
whereX(Z) =f(Z)/{l-F(Z)]is the hazard rate, i.e., the conditional
density of z at Z given z ￿ Z. The average benefits accruing to
each partner from the continuation of the partnership are measured by 1;5
themarginal change in the probability that the partner will break the
association is measured by X; and equation (4) indicates that the
optimum wage balances the expected losses from a break-up of the
partnership.
The optimum wage (i.e., the optimum allocation of returns) determines
the probability of job separation and the gains to be reaped from the
investment. The optimum size of the investment (h) is determined by the
traditional equality of marginal returns and marginal costs
—hh
The share of each partner in the returns determines his share in the
costs.
How are the wage rate, the probability of separation and the size of
the investment affected by an increase in the employee's mean productivity
respectively. To derive (3) the expected net gains of the two parties
canbebroken into three disjoint events: the employee quits, he is
fired, and the association continues. For details see Hashimoto (1979).
'
Equation(4) and the subsequent equations in this section are proved
in the appendix.
For example, 1i0(R -W)=(W-R)+E(OIe>R-W).The first term
measures the pecuniary rewards, the second term the nonpecuniary re-
wards, from continuation of the employment.+ —11- +
(M)?6 To answer this question, the nature of the distributions of the
random components n and U must be defined more explicitly. For the
rest of this section it will be assumed that these distributions are
normal zN(O, o) .Inthis case an increase in productivity, other
things being equal, increases the employer's share and his incentive to
maintain the association. The employer responds by increasing the wage
rate, allowing the employee to participate in the increased rewards. The
wage increase, however, falls short of the increase in productivity (i.e.,
W -Mdeclines). Consequently, the probability of firing and the proba-
bility of quitting both diminish, and the expected gain accruing to each
partner increases. The reduced risk of job separation and the increased
gains result in an increase in C and in the investment.
An increase in the reservation wage, on the other hand, reduces the
employee's incentive to stay at the job. It leads to increased wage
demands, to a decline in the employer's profits, and hence an increase
in the probability of job separation (at the initiative of either party).
The gains from the association diminish and so does the investment in
specific human capital.
An increase in the stock of specific human capital increases the
6 Foranalytical purposes, it is for the time being assumed that this
change in M is not associated with changes in the variance of fl,
nor is it accompanied by a change in the reservation wage R. At this
point the presentation departs from that of Hashimoto and Carmichael.
The results of this section apply to a much wider range of distributions,
whose properties are described in the appendix (I have so far not been
able to specify the general family of distributions for which the
conclusions hold). They are, however, by no means universal. The
exponential distribution (which satisfies A =1/p=constant)is a
nbtable counter example, where an interior solution does not exist.+ -12- +
employee'sproductivity and should increase his wage rate and reduce the
probability of job separation.8 However, when it comes to investment in
human capital, it is very difficult to draw the line between investment
in specific and general skills. The two are very often joint outputs of
the investment process, and there is no way of acquiring one sort of skill
without acquiring also the others (for example, one cannot acquire the
skills required to become an executive without learning the features of
thetrade which are specific to the firm). Thus, an increase in the stock
of human capital may raise the employee's productivity outside as well as
in the firm. In that case, the increase in M is accompanied by an
increase in the reservation wage, R.Both changes raise the wage rate.
However, so long as the increase in the reservation wage falls short of
the increase in productivity (dR <dM),the investment in specific human
capital reduces both quit rates and firing.9
II. THE INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE MARRIEDWOMAN
Ignoringpersonal variation in productivity and job satisfaction, the
investment in specific capital, wages, and job separation are affected by
the employee's expected productivity in the firm and by his reservation
wage. It is legitimate to assume that except for occupations which require
8ThusG/h =(G/M)(M/h) >0since both G/M and M/h are positive.
Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the random components n
and0 are invariant to the stock of human capital. The analysis
can easily be modified for the case where job satisfaction and personal
variation in productivity increase with the investment in human capital.
Hashimoto (1979) and Carmichael (1981) assume that M, R, r, and 0
increase at the same rate. If this is so, the investment in specific
human capital should not affect the separation rate.+ -13- +
physicalstrength, there is no inherent productivity difference between
the sexes. Sex-related differences in specific (and perhaps general) on-
the-job investment, wages, and tenure are therefore attributable to
differences in the reservation wage.
A man's reservation wage is usually the best wage offer he can
generate outside the firm. Barring unexpected events, such as drastic
changes in his state of health, his expected reservation wage changes
systematically with his stock of general human capital. As shown in the
preceding section, so long as the change in their reservation wage falls
short of the change in their productivity in the firm, men's wages and
specific investment are expected to increase and their separation rates
to decrease, as tenure increases.10
This is not true for women. In the labor force, women (in particular
the married) usually face a three-way choice: to stay with their firm, to
move to another firm, or to withdraw from the labor force altogether (i.e.,
to choose self-employment in the home sector). Women's reservation wage
is the alternative market wage or the value of home productivity, whichever
is the higher. In contrast to men's reservation wage, where the major
source of variation over time is the accumulation of human capital, the
reservation wage of married women varies sharply with the value of time
at home. Thus, it varies with demographic changes (marriage, divorce,
more children) and with the husband's income, not to mention husband-
instigated residential mobility (Mincer, 1978). These factors are subject
10Thisis true subject to two qualifications:(a) Given a finite time
horizon, the investment in specific as in other forms of human capital
will decline as the date of retirement approaches; and (b) like general
capital, specific capital may be subject to obsolescence.+ —14- +
to sharp variation over time; very often they also involve asymmetry of
information: they are known to the woman but not to her employer.11
To illustrate the woman's decision process, let it be assumed that
she faces two alternative wage schedules (Figure 1): a flat wage schedule
WA involving no investment in human capital,and a wage schedule WB
associated with investment in specific capital. The latter is composed
of a lower initial wage WBin the first period and a higher wage
(WB2 > WB1) thereafter. The woman's valueof home production is in
the first period but (because of demographic changes) it jumps to R2 in
the second (where WA < R2 < WB).12 A man who faces a constant value of
home production of will regard it as an inferior alternative, and
make his decision whether to invest or not on the basis of WA and WB
alone. A woman facing an exogenous jump in her home production can opt
for one of two alternatives. She can either opt for job A in the first
period and drop out of the labor force thereafter, or she can choose job
B and invest in human capital. The latter will be preferred if the
present value of the WB income stream exceeds the best alternative,
namely WA in the first period and R2 in the second. If the woman
chooses WB she will stay at her job (and, of course, in the labor force)
throughout her two-period career.
Throughout this paper I shall ignore another factor which may play an
important role in the sex-related differences in mobility and tenure.
Men's interfirm mobility may be impeded by transaction costs (e.g.,
costs of search) which are much lower for a woman who chooses self—
employment at home. The interaction of search costs and the investment
in specific capital and their effect on labor turnover are discussed
by Jovanovic (1979).
12 In Figure 1 it is assumed thatR1 > WB1. This assumption is not
essential to the discussion.+ -15- +
Figure1.
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However, as Figure 1 conveniently illustrates, given the higher home
reservation wage R2, women have less incentive to invest in human capital
than men (who are assumed to have a fixed home wage of R1 throughout).
Furthermore, given their higher reservation wage in period 2 (R2 > WA),
it has been shown that women may demand a higher wage, reducing the
profitability of the investment from the employer's point of view. Both
factors will result in a lower level of specific investment. Furthermore,
if specific and general capital are joint outputs, the employer's reluctance
to participate in the specific investment reduces the level of general
training.
Up to this point the analysis does not in essence depart from the
tradition. It does, however, give rise to some new questions. Of special
interest is the question of misconceptions concerning the career attachment
of women. Assuming that the value of home production is unobserved by the
employer, can a bias in his expectations concerning the woman's value of
time and the probability that she will quit be self-fulfilling?13
To answer this question one has to return to Hashimoto's model
described in the preceding section. It was argued there that the optimum
wage is the one that maximizes the joint gains from the investment in
specific human capital. It was implicitly assumed that the two parties
are in complete agreement about the parameters of the decision rules: the
joint gains, function G [equation (3)J is therefore acceptable to both.
13 The employer is usually not aware of the employee's personal plans
concerning children, marriage, divorce, or residential mobility. Even
if he knows the woman's family plans, he may be unable to assess her
quit probability because it will to a large extent depend on the
family's willingness to use substitutes for the woman's time (market
services or time of other members of the household).+ -17- +
Ifnot, and if the parties differ in their estimates of these parameters,
the problem has to be reformulated so as to take separate account of the
gains accruing to each party.
The gains to the employer accrue only so long as the
association between him and the employee continues, and are equal to the
difference between the employee's marginal productivity and the wage the
employer is committed to pay,
(6) Ge =- F)(1-Q)[(M
-W)+ > W-M)}
=(l-F)(l-Q)(W-M)
The employee gets wage W plus job satisfaction so long as the partner-
ship survives; should the partnership collapse, he gets the reservation
wage R,
(7) C =(1-F)(1-Q)[W+E(eJo>R-W)]+[1-(1-F)(l-Q)]R
=R+(1-F)(1-
Qfl.i0(R
-W)
From the employer's point of view the optimum wage is the one
maximizing Ge• The employer will press for lower wages so long as his
increased profits are not offset by the risk of the employee quitting the
firm.Anecessary condition for an optimum is
(8) A0(R -W)M(W-M)=1
where We is the employer's optimum wage.1 Roughly speaking, lowering
the wage rate by $1 increases profits by $1 but increases the risk of a
quit by X0 where the loss associated with a quit is Similarly,
Equation (8) and subsequent results are proved in the appendix.+ -18- +
the employee's gains are maximized when the wage he receives, W,
balances gains with potential losses
(9) Ari(Ww - - W)=1
Comparison of (8) and (9) indicates that a wage which is optimal
from the employer's point of view is not necessarily optimal from the
employee's. Furthermore, comparison of (8) and (9) with the necessary
condition for joint maximization {equation (4)] indicates that neither
of them maximizes the joint returns of the partnership. In maximizing
his own gains, each party ignores the loss imposed on the other by a
change in the wage rate. Hence, not surprisingly, the individual optimum
diverges from the joint optimum.
This divergence is demonstrated in Figure 2. The employee's desired
wage, W, is assumed to exceed that preferred by the employer, We•'5
Consequently, at W the marginal gain to the employee from raising the
wage falls short of the marginal gain to the employer from lowering it,
G < G. Similarly, at We an increase in wages entails marginal gains
to the employee which exceed the marginal losses to the employer. These
differences give rise to a wage renegotiation whose outcome is W0, the
wage at which the marginal gain to one party equals the marginal loss to
the other (G' =
w e
15 This is true in the case where r and 0 have uniform distributions
(see appendix).I suspect that it is also true in general (or at least
for all the distributions discussed in the preceding section), but I
have not yet been able to prove this. The point is, however, not
essential to the rest of the discussion.
16 The renegotiationmay assume the form of trading W against changes
in the share of investment costs, C.+
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Theseparate analysis of the employer's and employee's motives allows
the incorporation of misconceptions. Assume that the employer is wrong
about the value of the employee's home productivity. If he overestimates
the employee's reservation wage and if the marginal probability of a quit
(i.e., the hazard rate) increases with the reservation wage
[X0(R -W)/R}>0,'he will be more reluctant to press for lower wages
for fear of inducing a quit. Consequently, the negotiated wage (W1 in
Figure 2) will be higher, but so will the probability of the employee's
being fired. The higher wage and the higher probability of separation
reduce the profitability of the employer's investment and his investment
in specific capital. Thus, while in the short run this form of
misconception might increase the employee's share in the returns, it will
in the long run lower his wage rate (and flatten his wage-age profile)
because the investment has been curtailed. The lower wage rate makes the
employee more prone to quit when his reservation wage really goes up, thus
confirming the employer's expectations.
In an extreme case, the employer depicted in Figure 1 believes that
his employee's second-period reservation wage will exceed his productivity
in the market, M. In that case the employer refuses to participate in
the investment altogether. Thus the woman may be barred from investing in
specific human capital (i.e., in job B) and is forced to pick jobs which
involve little investment in training, such as job A; the result is
frequent entries and exits from the labor force associated with fluctua-
tions in her home wage.'8
This is true whenever the distribution of 0 is characterized by an
increasing hazard rate (e.g., when the distribution is uniform or
normal), orwhen aq/0 >0in the relevant range.
18Itmay be argued that the mere willingness to choose job B may serve+ - 21- +
Itshould be noted that when quit expectations are biased upward no
self-correcting mechanism exists. The employee who is offered a higher
wage (than if his quit probability had been correctly estimated) is
naturally not going to refuse, thus undercutting his long-run prospects
for investment in specific capital and wage advance. The higher quit
probability associated with the flat wage—age profile generates a vicious
circle of self-fulfilling prophecies.'9
III. WAGE RATES AND TURNOVER--PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
The preceding section established that self-confirming expectations
resulting in lower wages, a slower wage increase over the life cycle, and
a higher turnover rate are a definite theoretical possibility. Can the
direction of causation be ascertained empirically? Is it labor-force (or
more precisely, planned) separations that lead (through lower on-the-job
as a signal that the woman intends to stay in the labor force (since
job A would be preferred by anyone restricting his job tenure to one
period). This is admittedly true in the initial period, but need not
be true subsequently, when the wages in job B may exceed those in
job A. For more on the issue of the investment in specific capital
as a signal, see Salop and Salop (1976).
Note that underestimation of the reservation wage and the quit rate is
subject to a self-correcting mechanism. When underestimating R, the
firm may push the wage below the optimum level W0. This will generate
a suboptimal level of investment and will raise the quit rate. The
latter will tell the employer that his estimate of R is off the mark.
If the employer overestimates R, the effect on wages can be offset
only if the employee underestimates his future productivity M, and
therefore moderates his wage demands. Even so, the perceived gains
from the investment will be underestimated, leading to suboptimal
investment and self-fulfilling expectations on both sides.+ -22- +
investment)to lower wages, or is it lower wages which lead to labor-
force separations? Put in the context of sex-related wage differentials,
the question can be reformulated: is it women's plans which shape their
age-earnings profiles, or are they shaped by the employer's expectations?2°
This section reports on some preliminary tests, while the final verdict
is reserved for the next section.
A prerequisite for separating the two hypotheses is data on the
person's labor-force attachment as reflected in his future participation
plans. It is reasonable to assume that this piece of information, which
is, naturally, known to the employee, is not known to the employer. If
a person contemplates leaving the labor force (or quitting the firm) he
will as a rule be wiser not to disclose his intentions to his employer
prematurely. Similarly, an employee's declarationthathe is not going to
quit the firm in the foreseeable future may be discounted on the grounds
that it serves his interest to convey the impression that he is going to
stay with the firm, whatever his actual intentions. It may of course be
argued that the employee may hesitate to reveal his quitting plans to an
outside interviewer for the same reasons that he is reluctant to divulge
them to his employer. But one can then replace the data on plans by data
on their realization, naniely, the employeets subsequent behavior
20Sandelland Shapiro (1980) address themselves to the first part of this
question. They report that the investment in general training of young
women who plan to be out of the labor force at age 35 is lower than of
those who reported 5 years earlier that they intend to stay in the labor
force. Their study ignores the possibility that plans may change, and
their findings are restricted to young women (aged 19-29 in 1973). Even
if these findings are accepted, they do not preclude employers' expec-
tations from affecting women's age-earnings profiles.+ -23-- +
(specifically, his subsequent exit from the labor force).
The data on women's labor force participation plans (or their
realization) are the cornerstone of my test. In order to disentangle
cause and effect, I employ a simultaneous-equation scheme in which both
wage rates and planned (or future) labor exits are the endogenous
variables. The test is in essence a test of omission. If it is shown
that women's wages affect their planned exits but planned exits do not
affect wages, it will serve as prima facie evidence of employer discri-
mination. If this is the case, it will be argued that women's plans do
not matter, the effective constraint being that the employer's expectations
prevent women from attaining higher wages irrespective of whether they
plan to stay in the labor force.
Given the woman's wage in period t, the test requires knowledge of
her labor force plans and their subsequent realization. To obtain this
sort of data panel studies have to be used. The findings reported in this
paper are based on the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) conducted
by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The
ninth wave (1976) of this panel contained data of women's (as well as
men's) labor-force plans,2' and the subsequent waves (1977-79) provide
data on their realization.
21 The 1976questionnaire contained the question, "Do you think you will
keep on working for the next few years, or do you plan to quit?" The
1976 wave serves as a convenient base for two other important reasons:
(a) In that year heads of households and their wives were asked the
same questions (in other years heads were asked about the activities
of their spouses); and (b) the 1976 wave is one of the few containing
information on the wife's tenure on the job (i.e., position) and with
the firm (i.e., the same employer).+ -24- +
The sample contains information on about 1,900 women (married and
non-married) who were employed in a civilian job in 1976.22 A similar
sample of about 2,400 men served as a control group. About 10 percent
of the women in the sample (12 percent of the married women) reported that
they intended to quit the labor force within the foreseeable future (versus
3.5 percent of men). Actual exists, however, by far exceeded reported
intentions. Almost 30 percent of the women and 7 percent of the men
dropped out of the labor force for at least one year (more precisely,
reported being out of the labor force in at least one of the subsequent
waves). Moreover, as Table 1 indicates, only 20 percent of the women
quitting in 1977-79 reported any intention of doing so in 1976, and over
one third of those who planned to quit did not do so within the next 3
years. Since we cannot separate unexpected exits from unreported plans,
we shall use the data on plans and realizations interchangeably.
Hourly earnings are computed as the ratio of labor income and annual
hours. Following tradition (e.g., Mincer, 1974) the variable appears in
its logarithmic form.23 The explanatory variables in the hourly-earnings
function include years of schooling, years of experience, tenure with the
employer and on the job, whether the person belongs to a union, and
22 Thesample excludes farmers and farm managers and all other self-
employed and is restricted to those who were either head of house-
hold or head of household's spouse in 1977 and for whom there were
data throughout the period 1976-79 (i.e., it excludes people who died
or moved to other households during that period). The sample changes
somewhat from one test to the next because of missing information.
23 The data on hourly earnings reported in 1976 refer to 1975. Similar
results are obtained when one uses the 1977 wave data (which refer
to 1976).+ -25- +
Table1. The Distribution of Plans to Quit(1976)andActualLabor
Force Ecite (1977—79)
(percent)
Actual
exits,
1977-79
Plans toquit, 1976
Women Men
Yes No Total Yes No Total
Yes 6 22 28 2 5 7
No 3 68 72 2 91 93
Total 9 91 100 4 96 100+ -26- +
whetherthe job is a government (federal, state, or local) job. Marital
status, race, and region serve as control variables. In addition to these
traditional variables, two new variables were included in the regression:
years of training required for the job and on-the-job training. The labor-
force-separation and the plans-to-quit functions omit the tenure on the
job and required training but incorporate additional demographic variables:
presence of children, age of youngest child, children born in the period
1977-79, whether the person married or separated during that period, and
whether he moved to a new home. Finally, the labor-force-separation
function includes an income variable (family income, excluding the
respondent's earnings). The list of variables and their definitions are
presented in Table 2.
Comparison of the means of the two samples (Table 3) highlights
the major differences between the labor-market attributes of the
two sexes. Working women have a somewhat higher level of schooling
than their male counterparts, but have significantly less experience
(in the labor force, in the firm, and in the job) as a result of
having spent more time out of the labor force. There are considerable
sex differences in the occupational structure. Men have a greater
tendency to belong to a union, and women have a greater tendency to
work for the government. A smaller percentage of employed women
are married and a higher percentage are non-white. This reflects
the lower participation rate of married women and the higher
participation rate of non-white women. The percentage of women
reporting on-the-job learning that may lead to a better job is only
slightly lower than the corresponding percentage of men, but there
are substantial differences in job requirements: on the average+ —27- +
Table2. The Variables
Ihonan capital(years)
Schooling sc
Experience, years worked since age 18 EX
a! Tenure with employer— TE
Tenure on the job' TJ
Time out of labor force.E" TO
Age
Occupation (DV)
Professional, technical, and kindred workers
(base group) oc1
Managers, officials, proprietors oc2
Clerical and sales workers oc3
Foreman, craftsmen, firemen, police, transport OC
equipment operators oc5
Laborers
Family variables
Children (DV =1if children present) CH
Age of younger child, years CY
New child (DV =1if child born 1977-79) CN
Newly married (DV =1if married 1977-79) MN
Family separations (DV =1if respondent
separated 1977-79) FS
Family move (DV =1if respondent moved 1977-79) FM
Family income excluding respondent's earnings
($10,000 units) FY
Control variables
Maritalstatus (DV =1if respondent married) MS
Government (federal, state, or local) job (DV) GV
Union membership (DV) UM
Health impairment (DV)! HI
Region (DV =1if South) RG
Race (DV =1if black or Spanish-American) RC
.1.+ -27a- +
Table2 (continued). The variables
Endogenous variables
logof hourly earnings LHE
Labor force separation (DV =1if respondent
left labor force 1977-79) LSP
Plans to quit (DV =1if respondent planned
to quit in 1976) PTQ
On-the-job training (DV =1if respondent
reports training)!! OJI
Jobrequirement, years of training required for
RQT
Basedon the question "How long have you worked for your present
employer?"
Based on the question "How long have you had your present position?"
Time out of labor force since age 18 is measured as: age less
experience less post-l8 schooling less 18.
Based on the question "Do you have a physical or nervous condition
that limits the type of work or the amount of work you can do?"
Based on the question "Do you feel you are learning things in your
job that could lead to a better job or to a promotion?"
Based on the question "On a job like yours, how long would it take the
average new person to become fully trained and qualified?"+ -28- +
a/ Table3. SnpleMeansby Sex—
Women Men Difference
Schooling 12.12 11.87 0.25
Experience 12.67 17.63 -4.96
Tenure: with employer 5.08 7.83 -2.75
on the job 3.20 3.80 -0.60
Time out of labor force 5.21 0.63 4.37
Age 36.30 36.51 -0.21
Occupation: 1 0.156 0.138 0.018
2 0.041 0.110 -0.069
3 0.364 0,119 0.245
4 0.169 0.479 -0.310
5 0.270 0.154 0.116
Children 0.558 0.625 -0.067
Age of youngest child 4.14 3.89 0.25
Child born 1977-79 0.187 0.206 -0.019
Married in 1977-79 0.055 0.037 0.018
Family separation 0.057 0.054 0.003
Faiiiily move 0.373 0.407 -0.034
Family income 0.916 0.424 0.491
Marital status 0.668 0.868 -0.200
Government job 0.251 0.193 0.058
Union member 0.142 0.300 -0.158
Health impairment 0.066 0.064 0.002
Region 0.424 0.425 -0.001
Race 0.368 0.322 0.046
log hourly earnings 5.7982 6.2059 -0.4077
Labor-force separation 0.283 0.068 0.215
Plans to quit 0.093 0.037 0.056
On-the-job training 0.675 0.741 -0.066
Job requirement 0.745 1.695 -0.950
Sample size 1,936 2,398
See Table 2 for detailed definition of variables.+ -29- +
women report that their jobs require only 9 months of training,
compared with 20 months for men. Finally, labor-force separations
are four times as prevalent among women as among men, and men's
hourly earnings exceed women's by one half.
The simple multivariate relationships between hourly earnings, labor-
force separations and the set of explanatory variables are described in
Table 4. These equations contain hardly any surprises. Schooling and
experience are the major determinants of the hourly-earnings profiles.
Tenure on the job and with the employer have an effect which by far exceeds
the marginal effect of labor-force experience. If the tenure effectreflects the
returns to specific training, these results underline the importance of
investment in specific human capital in shaping the earnings profile.
Career interruptions tend to reduce wages, at least in the case of women
(Mincer and Ofek, l98l).2+ Union members receive higher wages than others
with the same observed qualifications. A government job is associated
with higher pay for women but lower pay for men. Married men are better
paid than non-married, but marital status has no effect on women's hourly
earnings. Health impairment, being non-white, and living in the south
tend to depress wages.
The effect of on-the-job investment on earnings is, in principle,
ambiguous. The cost of the investment should lower earnings early in one's
career but the returns on it raise earnings later on. Given the average
age of workers in the sample (36 years) the second effect predominates,
on-the-job training having a positive effect on women's earnings. Job
requirements reflect the amount of skill required for the job. This
2L+ Detailed discussion of the differences between the regressions for men
and women is deferred to the next section.+ -30- +
Table 4. The Determination of Hourib' Earnings and Labor-Force
Separations (OLS)
Women Men
log hourly Labor force log hourly Labor force
earnings (LHE)separations (LSP)earnings (LHE)separations (LSP
b b t b t b t
Cons4.654160.160.7303 6.154.893684.74 0.2984 4.61
SC 0.0685 13.290.0011 0.220.060118.27 0.0009 0.46
EX 0.0163 4.31-0.0124 3.520.0234 7.97 -0.0103 5.71
EX2-0.0004 4.160,0005 5.32-0.0004 6.08 0.0004 9.67
TE 0.0348 5.46-0.0059 1.370.0277 6.24 -0.0028 1.37
TE2-0.0006 3.250.0001 0.86-0.0005 3.72 0.0002 2.75
TJ 0.0724 4.37 0.0419 3.12
TJ2 -0.0094 5.08 0.0048 3.31
TO -0.0058 3.860.0088 6.000.0027 0.55 0.0124 4.55
OJT 0.0653 2.88-0.0541 2.680.0199 0.99 -0.0018 0.16
RQT 0.0359 4.14 0.0460 10.29
CH 0.0869 2.91 -0.0066 0.45
CY -0.0135 4.81 -0.0036 2.53
CM 0.356513.78 -0.0186 1.45
MN 0.1619 3.66 -0.0281 0.97
FS 0.0898 2.18 -0.0026 0.12
FM 0.0536 2.47 0.0130 1.18
FY 0.0246 1.69 -0.0161 1.57
MS 0.0124 0.540.1037 3.840.1096 4.28 -0.0086 0.45
GV 0.1056 4.16-0.0531 2.34-0.0320 1.48 0.0420 3.47
UM 0.2114 6.810.0133 0.470.233512.08 -0.0107 0.97
HI -0.1215 2.890.0808 2.14-0.1162 3.33 0.0549 2.81
RG -0.0470 2.00-0.0168 0.79-0.1132 5.92 0.0076 0.71
RC -0.1040 4.17-0.0415 1.82-0.0865 4.12 0.0124 1.06
LHE -0.0983 4.89 -0.0352 3.15
LSP
R2
-0.1010 4.22
0.33 0.20.
-0.1055 2.89
0.44, 0.17+ -31- +
variableproves to have an important positive effectwhich is independent
of the person's actual experience in the labor force and on the job.
The labor-force separation functions highlight two features: (a) the
probability of exit from the labor force declines as experience in the
labor force and with the firm increase (the age-separation probability
profile is convex); people who have left the labor force once are more
likely to do so again,25 and (b) through their effect on home productivity,
demographic variables are important determinants of women's career inter-
ruptions, but they hardly affect men.26 Thus being married, having
children (particularly young ones), having a husband with a high income,
and changes in family circumstances (getting married, separating, or having
more children), all increase women's tendency to leave the labor force.
Finally, the simple OLS equations cannot disentangle the direction
of causality: wages have a significant negative effect on separations and
future separations have a significant negative effect on wages.
The picture changes dramatically, however, once the two equations
25 The convexity of this function is discussed in detail by Mincer and
Jovanovic (1979).It may reflect the effect of general and specific
human capital or selectivity (people with a lower tendency to separate
have more labor-force experience and longer tenure). The positive
effect of time out of labor force may also be interpreted as an age
effect.
The separation functions (like all other dichotomous functions in
this paper) are estimated using linear OLS regression. I have experi-
mented with logit estimates but they did not alter the conclusions.
26 Other important differences occur in the case of race, non-white women
being more attached to the labor force than white women, while the
reverse is true of men, and women holding a government job have a
smaller tendency to drop out of the labor force while the reverse is
again true of men.+ -32- +
areestimated simultaneously (Table 5)•27 A simultaneous-equation system
explaining the determination of wages and labor-force separation abounds
with difficulties; a major one is the distinction between endogenous and
exogenous variables. An economist will be hard put to it to justify the
definition of children (and additional children) as exogenous in such a
scheme. Similarly, it is not clear how experience and tenure (i.e., past
non-separation) should be treated in this context. Nevertheless, at this
stage the list of endogenous variables is restricted to two: hourly earnings
and labor-force separation.
The simultaneous equations yield seemingly unambiguous conclusions
on the direction of causality. Lower wages tend to encourage labor-force
separation for both men and women, but separations (or plans to separate)
have no effect on wages. Thus the previously observed (Table 4) negative
effect of separations on wages is an artifact of the negative effect of
wages on separations. The simultaneous equations contain no indication
that women who plan to drop out of the labor force have lower wages as a
result, thus lending support to the hypothesis that it is employer's
expectation and actions which determine women's wages irrespective of
women's plans.28
27 The coefficients in Table S andsubsequent tables are derived by two-
stage least-squares (TSLS).
28 In an earlier version of thispaper separations included also those
quitting into unemployment. Expanding this definition of separation
does not affect our conclusions with respect to women, but in the case
of men it is found that plans to separate reduce wages.+ -33- +
Table5. The Simultaneous Determination of Eouriy Earnings and Labor Force
Participation (TSLS)
0.33 0.17 0.44 0.17
Women Men
LHE LSP LHE LSP
b t b t b t b t
Cons4.619054.43 2.4998 3.97 4.9288 62.37 0.58112.29
SC 0.068713.30 0.0299 2.64 0.0599 17:99 0.0048 1.22
EX
EX2
TE
TE2
0.0181
-0.0004
0.0354
-0.0006
4.32
4.19
5.52
3.29
-0.0050
0.0003
0.0069
-0.0001
1.08
2.47
1.06
0.68
0.0198 3.22
-0.0003 1.50
0.0261 5.07
-0.0004 2.54
-0.0088
0.0003
-0.0009
0.0001
3.89
7.60
0.36
1.99
TJ
TJ2
0.0751
-0.0098
4.47
5.17
0.0425 3.13
-0.0048 3.25
TO-0.0059 3.95o.oo 3.28 0.0059 0.85 0.01244.53
OJT0.0698 3.01-0.0251 1.03 0.0198 0.97 0.00080.07
RQT0.0370 4.22 0.0448 9.15
CH 0.09392.87 -0.00710.47
CY -0.0146 4.71 -0.00352.48
CN 0.342711.97 -0.02021.56
MN 0.17663.64 -0.02911.00
FS 0.11062.43 -0.00910.41
FM 0.05282.23 0.0122 1.10
FY 0.04412.56 -0.0141 1.34
MS 0.0035 0.14 0.08973.00 0.1022 3.62 -0.00180.09
GV 0.1096 4.26-0.00280.09-0.0212 0.78 0.03983.23
tiM 0.2117 6.80 0.0990 2.31 0.2276 10.57 0.00180.12
HI-0.1284 3.01 0.02990.67—0.0999 2.32 0.0478 2.32
RG
RC
-0.0465
-0.1023
1.98
4.09
-0.0320
-0.0750
1.35
2.72
-0.1105 5.59
-0.0837 3.86
0.0010
0.0052
0.08
0.39
LHE —0.0483 3.56 —0.0930 1.81
LSP—0.0339 0.48 •—0.37130.92+ -34- +
IV.WAGE RATES, TURNOVER AND ON THE JOB TRAINING- -SOME MORE EVIDENCE
Arethe results of the last section as unambiguous as they seem? A
reassessment of the procedure used raises some doubts. The doubts concern
the validity of the specification and in particular the assumption that
on-the-job training (OJT) and job requirements (RQT) are exogenously
determined. It is after all inherent in the problem that these variables
are determined by the person's participation plans and what the employer
conceives the plans to be. A person who expects to drop out of the labor
force in the near future will be more reluctant to invest in human capital
and choose a job which requires more training. Furthermore, a person who
is expected to drop out of the labor force may not get the opportunity to
work on a job that requires a high level of training, irrespective of his
actual plans. Thus the natural place of these factors is among the
endogenous rather than the exogenous variables.
Accordingly, I extended the model to include four endogenous
variables: log hourly earnings (LHE), separation from labor force (LSP)
(or alternatively, PTQ, plans to quit the labor force), on-the-job training
(OJT) and job requirements (RQT). The relationships between them are
described schematically in Figure 3. Hourly earnings are assumed to
depend only indirectly on labor-force separation. Planned separations
are assumed to affect on-the-job training and the kind of job the person
chooses (as measured by the job requirements), which in turn affect wages.
Job separations depend on the wage rate but not on the opportunities for
on-the-job training and not on job requirements.29 On-the-job training
29 In theory, aperson may be more reluctant to quit his job and the
labor force if the job offers opportunities for promotion and greater+ -35-- +
Figure3.+ -36- +
isexpected to increase with job requirements and be reduced by plans to
quit the labor force. The probability that a person is investing in human
capital on the job is expected to decline with age, experience, and tenure
with the employer. Schooling is conventionally assumed to facilitate on-
the-job training and union membership has been shown (Mincer, 1981) to
discourage it.30 Job requirements (RQT) will be inversely related to
labor force quits (LSP) if employees who plan to drop out of the labor
force opt for jobs that are less skill (and training) intensive. They
may be positively related to the person's readiness to invest in human
capital (OJT). The amount of training required for the job naturally
depends on the occupation and it is expected that the more educated and
the more experienced (in terms of both overall experience and experience
with the firm) will land the more skilled jobs. Jobs held by union members
may require less training than others.31
responsibility (as measured by OJT and RQT, respectively). This is
not, however, supported by the data.
30 Otherexogenous variables appearing in the OJT equation are government
job, marital status, and race. Although OJT is a dichotomous variable,
the OJT equation employs a linear specification.
31 Otherexogenous variables in the RQT equation are government job,
marital status, and race. The variable RQT has been interpreted (Duncan
and Hoffman, 1979, p. 596) to mean "the volume of training attached to
the current job and acquired on the job." There is, however, nothing
in the survey question (see notes to Table 2) to suggest that the
training was obtained on the current job, and not in other firms or
jobs. By Duncan and Hoffman's definition, the person invests in specific
capital whenever RQT exceeds the person's tenure on the job (TJ).
Comparing this definition of training with ours (OJT) for white men
and women, it can be seen that they differ considerably (the numbers
in parentheses are percentages within the OJT group).
.1.+ _37_ +
The estimates of the structural equations are presented in Table 6.
The hourly-earnings functions (Table 6, Part A) do not differ substantially
from those reported in the preceding section (Table 5)--on-the-job training
and job requirements have a strong positive effect on wages. Comparing
the equations for men and women it is observed that schooling, experience,
and tenure each have essentially the same effect on the wages of both
sexes, as have on-the-job training and job requirements (the only exception
is job tenure, which has a stronger effect in the case of women). The
negative effect of career interruptions is more pronounced in the case of
women. The wage premium enjoyed by union members is greater in the case
of men, and government jobs tend to favor women (in the case of men, such
a job is associated with lower wages),32
Neither are our earlier conclusions with respect to labor separations
affected by the change in the estimation scheme in Table 6, Part B.
Comparison of the equations indicates that schooling, labor-force
experience, tenure, and wages have the same effect on both sexes, and
OJT Whitewomen White men
RQT< TJ P.QT> TJ RQT< TJ RQT> TJ
0 (86) (14) 34 (81) (19) 26
1 (75)
79
(25)
21
66
100
(61)
66
(39)
34
74
100
The differences are even larger for non-whites.
32Contrary to previous findings, it is found that the wage differential
between whites and non-whites is greater for women than for men. This
contradiction may be ecplained by the fact that the regression reported
controls for job requirements, in which there are substantial inter—
race differences for men, but which are almost the same for women of
both race groups.+ -38-
+
Table6. The Simultaneous Determination of HourlyEarnings, Labor Force
Separation, On-the-Job Training and Job Requirements.
A. Log Hourly Earnings
Women Men Difference
b t b t b t
Cons 4.5328 27.95 4.6331 23.22-0.1003 0.51
SC 0.0262 2.51 0.0320 4.65-0.0058 0.62
EX 0.0164 3.32 0.0167 3.40-0.0003 0.05
EX2 -0.0004 3.38-0.0002 2.59-0.0002 1.65
TE 0.0225 256 0.0177 2.88 0.0048 0.60
TE2 -0.0003 1.24-0.0003 1.80 0.0000 0.05
TJ 0.0943 3.82 0.0460 2.59 0.0483 2.14
TJ2 -0.0096 3.66-0.0040 2.10-0.0056 2.33
TO —0.0031 1.50 0.0090 1.28—0.0121 2.10
MS 0.0051 0.17 0.0711 1.97—0.0660 1.83
GV 0.0365 1.02-0.0361 1.20 0.0725 2.06
UM 0.2496 6.03 0.3158 10.83-0.0662 1.76
HI -0.1076 1.93-0.0563 1.12—0.0513 0.91
RG -0.0763 2.41—0.1546 5.43 0.0783 2.44
RC -0.1151 3.30-0.0151 0.32-0.1001 2.24
OJT 0.7910 5.04 0.6643 2.52 0.1268 0.53
RQT 0.1929 4.27 0.1488 3.95 0.0441 1.00
R2 0.23 0.31+ ..39_ +
Table6.The Simultaneous Determination of Hourly Earnings, Labor Force
Separation, On-the-Job Training and Job Requirements.
B. Labor Force Separation
Women Men Difference
b t b t b t
Cons 1.3830 3.99 0.6813 2.80 0.7016 1.62
SC 0.0119 1.64 0.0062 1.62 0.0057 0.74
EX -0.0093 2.44-0.0082 3.67 -0.0012 0.27
EX2 0.0004 4.15 0.0003 7.40 0.0001 0.63
TE -0.0007 0.14-0.0003 0.13-0.0004 0.07
TE2 0.0000 0.21 0.0001 1.84-0.0001 0.61
TO 0.0080 5.00 0.0124 4.50-0.0045 1.10
CH 0.0954 3.15-0.0068 0.45 0.1021 3.23
CY -0.0148 5.17-0.0036 2.48-0.0112 3.75
CN 0.3542 13,44-0.0206 1.58 0.3747 13.68
MN 0.1638 3.65-0.0293 1.00 0.1931 3.60
FS 0.0989 2.36-0.0114 0.51 0.1103 2.44
FM 0.0514 2.33 0.0121 1.08 0.0394 1.71
FY 0.0327 2.16-0.0135 1.28 0.0462 2.46
MS 0.0969 3.52 0.0006 0.03 0.0963 2.75
CV -0.0355 1.43 0.0390 3.16-0.0745 2.88
LIM 0.0495 1.52 0.0059 0.39 0.0436 1.33
HI 0.0572 1.44 0.0451 2.19 0.0122 0.29
RG -0.0258 1.20-0.0012 0.10-0.0247 1.04
RC -0.0556 2.33 0.0027 0.20-0.0583 2.22
LHE -0.2464 3.37-0.1133 2.31 -0.1331 1.50
R2 .0.19. 0.17+ 40 +
Table6. The Simultaneous Determination of HourlyEarnings, Labor Force
Separation, On-the-Job Training and Job Requirements.
C. On-the-Job Training
Women Men Difference
b t b t b t
Cons 0.6991 6.64 0.8276
SC 0.0108 1.40 0,0035 0.63 0.0073 0.79
EX -0.0004 0.18 0.0009 0.21 -0.0012 0.27
TE 0.0008 0.29-0.0022 1.10 0.0030 0.90
TJ -0.0185 3.41-0.0095 2.33-0.0091 1.37
Age -0.0035 2.46-0.0081 1.95 0.0046 1.04
MS -0.0028 0.12 0.0442 1.61-0.0471 1.31
GV 0.0146 0.53 0.0429 1.84-0.0283 0.80
UM -0.0320 1.02-0.0304 1.25-0.0017 0.04
RG 0.0362 1.52 0.0532 2.62-0.0170 0.56
RC 0.0529 2.08 0.0984 3.16-0.0455 1.15
LSP -0.1365 2.40-0.2182 1.49 0.0817 0.52
RQT 0.0486 1.52 0.0749 2.83-0.0263 0.65
R2 0.05 0.08+ -41-- +
Table6. The Simultaneous Determination of Hourly Earnings., Labor Force
Separation, On-the-Job Training and Job Requirements.
D. Job Requirements
Women
b t b
Men Difference
t b t
Cons 0.3374 0.80 0.6733 0.81-0.3360 0.38
SC 0.1154 7.67 0.1307 6.74-0.0152 0.60
EX 0.0143 3.86 0.0341 4.66-0.0198 2.55
TE 0.0094 1.47 0.0340 5.18-0.0246 2.45
0C2 -0.4365 2.72 0.1847 1.08-0.6212 2.44
0C3 -0.9770 10.42-0.9909 5.950.0139 0.08
OC
0C5
-1.0986
-1.1351
7.45
7.65
-0.5262
-1.0759
3.25
4.72
-0.5724
-0.0591
2.43
0.22
MS 0.0448 0.71-0.0175 0.140.0623 0.46
CV 0.1728 2.47-0.0263 0.230.1990 1.52
UN -0.0830 0.99-0.4059 3.790.3229 2.29
RG -0.0141 0.21 0.1213 1.14-0.1354 1.10
RC -0.0321 0.41-0.7346 6.870.7025 5.22
LSP -0.1318 0.84-2.0879 3.311.9560 3.52
OJT -0.5340 1.20-0.5548 0.560.0207 0.02
R2 0.22 0.23+ -42- +
demographicchanges are significantly more important in the case of women.
The linear probability functions of on-the-job investment are
(statistically) the same for men and women (Table 6, Part C). The
probability is not directly affected by schooling, experience in the
labor force, or tenure with the firm, but declines as job tenure and age
increase. Being a union member discourages training, and (surprisingly)
non-whites report more often than whites that what they learn on the
current job may help them gain better jobs in the future. Finally, as
expected, the greater the amount of training required on the job, the
greater the probability that the person is engaged in investment; and the
greater the probability of dropping out of the labor force, the smaller
the probability of investment.
The fact that schooling has no direct effect on on-the-job training
may at first be surprising, given past studies in the field. The puzzle
however, disappears once the fourth equation, job requirements, is
incorporated into the analysis (Table 6, Part D). According to this
equation, schooling affects on-the-job training through its effect on job
requirements. Thus the skill intensity of a job increases both with
formal schooling and experience (both in the labor force and with the
firm).33 it is, however, noteworthy that while the effect of schooling
on the type of job a person gets is almost the sante for men and women,
there is a substantial difference in the effect of experience. When it
comes to securing a better (i.e., a more skill intensive) job, women's
Other factors worth noting are: marital status does not seem to affect
the type of job a person gets; women may get more challenging jobs in
the government sector; jobs held by union members are, in the case of
men, less training intensive; non-white men get worse jobs than whites
(Duncan and Hoffman, 1979).+ -43- +
yearsin the labor force and with the firmcountas less than one half of
the men's. The lower weight given to women's years of experience may be
due to an actual tendency for women to invest less on the job (i.e., a
year's experience represents a smaller increment to human capital); or
to employers' belief in the existence of such a tendency.
Furthermore, though there is no significant difference between the
sexes in the job requirement of professional, technical, and kindred
workers (the intercept is lower for women, but not significantly so),
there is a significant difference in two out of the other four occupational
groups. Thus, even if one controls for other observed variables and allows
for differential effects, women in managerial occupations and women
employed as foremen (forepersons?), craftsmen, police, etc., report fewer
months of training required for their jobs than reported by their male
counterparts.
Finally, there is a remarkable difference between men and women in
the effect of labor-force separations on the type of job a person has (as
measured by RQT).35 While men's plans to quit are associated with lower
job requirements, women's plans to quit have no effect on job requirements.
Iam aware that it can be argued that this is essentially a reporting
problem. Men, to bolster their self image, tend to overestimate job
requirements while women and members of minority groups tend to
understate them. There is no way to verify or reject this argument
from our data. It is worth noting, however, that in the related issue
of on-the-job training, non-whites do not believe themselves to fare
worse than whites.
I do not present the estimates of the OJT and RQT equations where LSP
is replaced by PTQ. These regressions are virtually identical to the
ones reported, indicating that our conclusions concerning the effect
of future separations hold also for plans to quit.+ -44- +
Assumingthat employers are ignorant of their employeest plans, I interpret
this finding to mean that whereas men are free to choose their jobs, and
thus choose a job with lower training requirements when they expect to drop
out of the labor force, women are forced to take jobs which are less skill
intensive regardless of their participation plans. It may be argued that
women are forced into these lower skilled jobs by discrimination. It is
my belief that it is due to misconceptions of women's market attachment
and the difficulty of separating those with low from those with high
attachment.
V. EVALUATION
Supporters of the traditional views concerning the sources of wage
differentials between men and women may find comfort in the findings of
the last section, particularly those concerning the participation of
married women. Once again it was demonstrated that women are more
sensitive than men to changes in the family environment. Planned changes
in their family life, such as additional children, are associated with
labor-force quits, which are in turn associated with reduced on-the-job
investment. But one can detect an additional undercurrent--women are
relegated to low-skill jobs regardless of their labor-force plans, and
when it comes to choice (or allocation) of jobs (as measured by RQT),
their labor-force experience carries a much lower weight than that of
men with the same observable (or, to be more precise, measurable)
qualifications.
How important is this second factor in explaining sex-related wage
differentials? Can one distribute the blame for the wage differential
between the two explanations? These are difficult but important+ -45- +
questions, and I shall risk some tentative answers.
In order to isolate the different factors contributing to the wage
differentials, the variables appearing in regression (6A) are combined
into five groups: the intercept, variables measuring the person's human
capital (schooling, experience, tenure with the employer, tenure on the
job, time out of labor force), on-the-job training (OJT), job requirements
(RQT), and control variables (government job, union membership, health
impairment, region, race, and marital status). Furthermore, equation (6A)
was re-estimated for both men and women with the coefficients whose sex
difference was found to be statistically nonsignificant (e.g., schooling,
experience, tenure with employer, health impairment, on-the-job training,
and job requirements) constrained to be identical in the regressions for
men and women.36 The new estimates are used to break down the wage
differential into the five major components (see panel A of Table 7).
Women earn two thirds of men's hourly earnings. This is consistent
with the findings of many other studies in the field. The composition of
the differential may, however, come as a surprise to some. Job requirements
and on-the-job training (in particular the first) are by far the most
important factors explaining the wage gap, accounting for half of it. By
comparison, the direct contribution of schooling, labor-force experience,
and tenure (holding job requirements constant), is very small (about 4
percent), as is the autonomous factor (measured by the difference in
intercepts).37 The wage differentials can be broken down into the part
36 The regressions are presented in the appendix. They allow for a
different intercept even when the differences in intercepts reported
in Tables 6 were not significant.
The 'other' variables account for about one quarter of the wage gap,
the major contributors being union membership, race, and marital status.+ -46-
Table 7. The Deconrposition of the Sea Differentials in the Endogenous
Varab
+
Total Explained by
difference in means,
weighted by
Explainedbydiffer-
enceincoefficients,
weighted by
A
f
A
m
- -
x x
f m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(EriE) A. Hourly earnings
Constant
Human capital
Control
OJT
RQT
Total
LHE
Total
B. Labor force separation (ISP)
Constant
Human capital
Faini ly
Control
C. On-the-job training
Constant
Human capital
Control
-0.0634
0.9k
-
1.00
-
1.00
-0.0634
Q.9t1
-0.0634
0.91+
-0.0376
0.96
-0.0699
0.93
-0.0200
0.98
-0.0176
0.98
0.0323
1.03
-0.1076
0.90
-0.0479
0.95
-0.0717
0.93
-0.0359
0.97
-0.0597
0.9'.
-0.0458
0.96
-0.0458
0.96
-0.0458
0.96
-
1.00
-
1.00
-0.1636
0.85
-0.1636
0.85
-0.1636
0.85
-
1.00
-
1.00
-0.4179
0.66
-0.3271
0.72
-0.3010
0.7'.
-0.1169
0.89
-0.0908
0.91
-0.0352 - - -0.0352 -0.0352
0.0063 0.0087 0.0181 -0.0118 -0.0024
0.2079 -0.0206 -0.0064 0.2143 0.2285
-0.0426 -0.0095 -0.0027 -0.0399 -0.0331
0.0780 0.0780 0.0780 - -
0.2144 0.0566 0.0870 0.1274 0.1578
0.0248 - - 0.0248 0.0248
0.0150 0.0199 0.0191 -0.0041 -0.0049
-0.0128 0.0070 0.0089 -0.0217 -0.0198
-0.0421 -0.0421 -0.0421
-0.0515 -0.0515 -0.0515
-0.0666 -0.0667 -0.0656 -0.0010 0.0001
LSP
RQT
Total
.1.+
Table7 (continued). The Decorrrpocition of the Sex Differentials in the
EndogenouB Vari41b les
Total Explained by
difference in means,
weighted by
Explained by differ-
ence in coefficients
weighted by
f Xf
X
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D. Job requireents(RQT)
Constant -0.5677 - - -0.5677-0.5677
Human capital -0.5960 -0.0686 -0.2298 —0.3662 -0.5274
Occupations -0.3090 -0.0021 -0.2157 -0.0933 -0.3069
Control 0.3792 0.0120 0.0353 0.3439 0.3672
LSP 0.1081 -0.0253 —0.4492 0.5573 0.1334
OJT 0,0352 0.0352 0.0352 - -
Total -0.9502 -0.0488 -0.8242 -0.1260 -0.9014
Columns (1) through (5) are respectively calculated from the columns
of Table A2 as follows: (1) —(3);(1) —(2);(4) —(3);(1) —(4);
(2)-(3).Small numerals in pahel A are the antilogs of the
difference of the logarithms.+ -48-- +
whichis 'explained' by the difference in the means of the two sexes, and
the 'unexplained' part (the part due to differences in regression
coefficients).38 Three quarters of the hourly-earnings differential is
explained by the difference in the observed characteristics of men and
women (and their jobs), and only about one quarter cannot be explained.
Again, job requirements ranks high among the explanatory variables
(contributing two thirds of the explanation) and overshadow the direct
effect of differences in experience and tenure.
By our assumptions, labor-force turnover does not affect wages
directly, but does so indirectly through its effect on training (OJT) and
job requirements (RQT). On the other hand, lower wages have been shown
to lead to increased turnover. To disentangle cause and effect one should
separate the causes of labor force separation.
The difference between the 3-year separation rates of men and women
is 21 percentage points. Decomposing this difference by a method similar
to the one described above (panel B, Table 7)39indicatesthat demographic
38Followingstandard procedures, if =
EJiXUfor group j,
Y-Y=E.(. -X.)+Z(.- fm 1fi fi mi fimimi
=.( . -X.)+Z(.-.)X., j mifi mi fi mi fi
where Y denotes mean of log hourly earnings, Xj the mean of
explanatory variable i, ,theestimated regression coefficients,
and m and f denote male and female, respectively. The first and
second terms on the RI-IS are respectively the explained and unexplained
part of the wage differential.
The explanatory variables included in regression (6B) were combined
into five groups: the intercept, the human capital variables, family
variables (MS, CH, CY, CN, FS, MN, FM, FY), hourly earnings (LHE), and
the rest. Note that marital status is here included in family variables
(not, as elsewhere, as a control variable).+ .-49.. +
changes(e.g., children, marriage, divorce, migration) are the major
contributor to this difference. In the absence of this factor, labor-
force turnover would have been about the same for both sexes. The wage
differential stands second in the order of importance, However, closing
the wage gap, other things being the equal, would not have eliminated the
difference in turnover rates (though it would have cut it by about one
third). The difference in wages is a major source of the 'explained'
difference, while sex differences in responsiveness to demographic factors
are the most important contributor to the unexplained part.
The difference between the percentage of men and women reporting on-
the-job learning which would be helpful in gaining a better (or a better-
paid) job is surprisingly small (74 versus 67 percent, respectively).
Almost the whole of this difference is explained by differences in the
observed characteristics, the difference in turnover and job requirements
being the most important.
Finally, the skill intensity of the job (as measured by RQT) has
throughout this paper been shown to be crucial in explaining the sex
differential in training and wages (and indirectly, through the latter,
in turnover). How helpful are the regressions in explaining the huge gap
in job requirements? The answers they provide are at once puzzling and
illuminating. Men's jobs require training that exceeds that of women's
by almost a whole year (20 and 8.9 months of training, respectively).
Standardizing for racial composition, marital status, union membership
and the 'other' variables (government job, region) increases the difference
to 16 months, almost one half of which is explained by the autonomous
factor (i.e., the intercept).'° The other half is traced to differences
kOTheresult stands in contrast to the results reported in Table 6, part
D, where the sex difference in intercepts is found to be nonsignificant.+ -50- +
inexperience (in the labor force and with the employer) and to the
occupational structure of the two sexes. Surprisingly, the difference in
turnover tends to moderate the difference in training requirements.
How much of these differences are explained by differences in the
observed characteristics? The answers to this question differ widely
according as one adopts a 'masculine' or a 'feminine' point of view.
Judging from men's experience (i.e., when the men's coefficients of labor-
force experience, turnover, and occupational composition are applied in
the standardization procedure), close to 90 percent of the difference in
RQT is explained by the difference in observed characteristics. In that
case, changing the participation behavior (labor-force separation,
experience, and tenure with the employer) and the occupational structure
of women to make them similar to men would eliminate the differential
almost entirely (it would reduce the difference in job requirements to
less than one month). On the other hand, judging from women's experience
(i.e., if we weight the difference in characteristics by the regression
coefficients derived from the women's sample), such a change would have only a
small effect. Specifically, if women's quits were reduced to the level
of men's, the quality of their jobs (as measured by RQT) would go up by
only 3 percent (the RQT differential would decline by 2 percent).
Equalization of labor-force experience and tenure would have increased
RQT by another 14 percent, and adoption of the men's occupational structure
would yield less than 1 percent.Ll All in all (using this scheme)
klThelast statement is, of course, true only if confined to the broad
occupational definitions used in this study; it may prove to be wrong
if one uses a more detailed definition. Put differently: given our
definition, although occupational structure is important in explaining
the wage distribution (through the effect of RQT on hourly earnings)+ -51- +
differencesin observed characteristics explain about 5 percent of the
difference in RQT.
When the control variables (GV, UM, HI, RG, RC, and MS) are controlled
for, women's hourly earnings are about three quarters of the men's. If
women had reacted to demographic changes in a fashion siniilar to men there
would have been no sex difference in labor-force quit rates. In consequence
women would invest more on the job and would obtain better jobs. These
changes would in turn raise women's wages (and result in a further decline
in quit rates). Going by men's experience (i.e., given the effect of
labor-force separation on RQT from the men's regression) this first-round
effect would close over 40 percent of the wage gap (i.e., reduce it from
27 to 16 percent of men's wages). On the other hand, given women's
experience the wage gap would decline by only about 10 percent (from 27
to 24 percent).
VI.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Inthis paper I have tried to formalize an alternative to the traditional
hypothesis concerning the wage differential between men and women.
Admittedly, there is little new in the general concept. The notion that
women suffer from 'statistical discrimination' has been with us now for
more than a decade (Arrow, 1973, Phelps, 1972). What is new, on the
theoretical side, is the attempt to show, within the framework of the
theory of human capital, how employers' misconceptions (the statistical
discrimination) translate into flatter wage profiles for women.I also
try to explain why there are no self-correcting mechanisms (or if they do
there remain substantial intra-occupational differences between men
and women.+ -52- +
exist,why they operate very slowly) to reveal his mistake to the
employer. In the absence of such mechanisms, women may be confronted by
a vicious circle of self-confirming expectations, expectations of increased
job mobility resulting in increased job mobility.
On the empirical level, 1 have shown that women's labor force
participation decision is definitely more sensitive to demographic changes
than men's. On the other hand, this difference goes only part of the way
in explaining the wage differential between the sexes. The amount of
training required for the job is an intervening factor crucial for
explaining the wage gap. The fact that employers give different weight
to the observed characteristics of men and women when making job offers
seems to be an essential ingredient of the situation.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to separate
cause and effect in the hourly-earnings and labor-career-interruption
functions. Naturally, it suffers from many shortcomings. In a
simultaneous-equation scheme such as the one presented, it is hard to
justify the choice of labor-force experience, tenure, and occupational
choice as exogenous variables. Similarly, it can be argued that family
stability and fertility behavior are affected by the labor-force-
participation decision as well as affecting it.
I have focused on hourly earnings and the participation decision at
the expense of other dimensions of the phenomenon.I have emphasized
participation, ignoring other aspects of the work decision (e.g., the
number of hours worked) which may serve as an indicator of the woman's
involvement with the market. In the empirical sections I discuss labor
force turnover, although in principle the variable one should discuss is
job turnover. The wage variable used in the statistical analysis is the+ -53 +
levelof hourly earnings. The panel data, however, allow us to examine the
effect of turnover on temporal changes in wages. Finally, as mentioned,
the crucial variable in my analysis, job requirements (RQT), has elsewhere
been interpreted as "the volume of training attached to the current job
and acquired on the job" (Duncan and Hoffman, 1979). In my interpretation
the required training need not necessarily be obtained on the current job
(see also note 31).
On a more fundamental level it may be argued that women's labor-force
experience and tenure count for less than men's in the determination of
RQT because women invest less on the job, so that a year of experience
represents a smaller stock of human capital. This argument is refuted by
the wage function which indicates that once one controls for the quality
of the job, experience and tenure have the same effect for both sexes.
It may of course be argued that the training received by women differs
from what men receive because they occupy different jobs, but this argument
would only establish the existence of the vicious circle.
The final question is, naturally, is there a way of escape? There
is no clearcut answer. To judge from on-the-job training the differences
between men and women are relatively small, indicating that the the gap
in training and wages is closing on its own. The conclusions derived from
the simultaneous-equation system are much more pessimistic. What is
required is a structural change which will open to women the opportunities
enjoyed by men. Allowing women into jobs requiring the same degree of
skill may give rise to a chain of events that will narrow (though perhaps
not eliminate) the difference in turnover. In the short run, closing the
wage gap should, according to our estimates, cut the women's labor-force
separations by more than one quarter. In the long run, it may affect the+ -54- +
structuralequation, reducing women's sensitivity to demographic changes
and reducing their turnover even further.
If the structural change in the jobs open to women does not take
place one can expect economists to continue to argue from their own
experience: the men, that if women only invested more in their careers
the wage gap would disappear, and the women, that this would make no
difference.+ -55- +
MATHEMATICALAPPENDIX
Thegains from continuing the association between employer and employee
in the post-investment period are
(Al) G =(1-F)(l-Q)[(M-R)+E(flIfl > W-M)+E(OIO>R-
where
W-M
F(W -M)=prob(rj<W-M)=ff()d
(A2) R-W
Q(R -W)=prob(O<R-W)=Iq(O)dO
are the probabilities of firing and quitting, respectively. Denoting the
expected residuals by
-M)= > (W-M)]
-(W
-M)
=[1-F(W-M)]'![l -F()]d
W-M
(A3)
-W) = E[OlO > (R-W)I-(R-W)
=[1
-Q(R-W)]R-W -Q(O)]dO
equation (Al) can be rewritten as
(A4) G =(1-F)(1-Q){[M-W+E(fllfl>W-M)]+
+ [W-R+E(OlQ>R-W)]}
=(1-F)(1Q) [(W -M)+ W)]
Maximizing G with respect to W,+ -56- +
(AS) =q(l-
F)M(W
-M)-£(l-
Q)0(R
-W)
where f andF are evaluated at the point (W -M)and q and Q at
(R -W).2Denoting the hazard rate by X(Z) =f(Z)/[l
-F(Z)],
equation (A5) can be rewritten as
______M0(R-W) -qX(W -M) X0(R -W)
(A6)
=(1
-F)(l
-
Q)[X0(R
- M)-A(W-
M)ie(R
-W)];
setting this expression to equal zero, one derives the necessary condition
for the optimum wage given by (4) in the text.
The sufficient condition for a maximum isk3
(A7) = + +
W)
+ci] <01
since
3A(Z)
=X(Z)[!J0z
+
i (Z)
(A8) =X(Z)p(Z)
-1
_______—u(Z)flogf(Z) 1 —1CLz
+
Thebracketed terms in (A7) are positive when £ andq increase with
(P1-M) and CR-P1),respectively (i.e., £'> 0andq' >0).
'.2Toobtain (A5), recall that [l -F(Z)]1z(Z)/Z
=-[1-F(Z)],by
(A3).
'. and £ are evaluated at(P1 -M);,A0,and q, at
(R-W).+ 57
+
However,one of the two terms may be negative without impairing the
validity of the second-order condition.t"' The conclusions of Section I,
however, only hold when both terms are positive.
To derive the effect of an increase in productivity, M, one has to
compute
(A9)
—1rThlogf+
1
WM -M) p1
The wage increases with productivity,
= >0
whenever (A9) is positive. Similarly, an increase in the reservation
wage, R, increases the wage rate when
AlO 2G _Y°rlogq 1
( aWR - - W)
+—
ispositive. If both (A9) and (AlO) are positive, it can easily be shown
that 1 >W/M>0and1 >W/R>0,and hence (W -M)and (R -W)
decline as M increases and as R decreases. Consequently, an increase
in productivity reduces the probability of firing, F, and the probability
of quits,Q, while an increase in the reservation wage increases them.
&cample: Let r and 0 have a normal distribution, z 'N(O,ci), then
PZ(Z)= A(Z)c - Z
(All)
=a2-[Z/X(Z)] = a2[l-X/A(X)],
wherex =z/ais the standardizednormal variable (X =Z/a).Hence
t"Inthe case of the exponential distribution, p/X =X2and
2G/aW2 =0.+ -58- +
i (Z)
(A12)
X(Z)
=-
X(X)
+- XA(X)}<0
since the expression in brackets is positive Johnson and Katz, 1969, p. 279).
The optimum wage satisfies G/W 0,i.e.,
(Al3) -
X(X)]
=
G[l
-____
wherex = andy = arestandardized normal variables, and
X =(W-
M)/cand Y=(R-
W)/ci0.Using our previous results,
w a2G a2G =
awaMW
(A14) xx)[1 +X2-
XA,(X)J
+X2-
XA(X)J
+ +- YA(Y)]
and it is easy to show that 1 >SW/3M>0.
Turning now to the separate maximization of employer gains, Gej
and employee gains, G, we get
Ge =(1-F)(1 -Q)i(W M)
(AlS)
C =R+(1F)(l - - W)
Maximizing Ge and G with respect to We and W, respectively,
yields the necessary conditions
-x—(1-F)(l-Q)[l
-
A0(R
-W)p(W-M)]=0
(A16)
=(1-F)(1-Q)[1
-A(W-
M)pe(R
-
Ww)}
=0
The second-order conditions are+ _59- +
p(logq) ___= -(1-F)(l -
+1-x + < o
(A17)
2G p 1ogf
___= -(1-F)(l-
Q)(D(w- M)
+1 +X}<
0
Example:Letri and U have a uniform distribution,
f() =l/t -½t <n <
(Al8)
q(6)=1/s -½s <U<
Hence
F(W -M)=
WM
(A19)
Q(R -W)= R-W
and
X (W -M)=f/(l-F)=l/[½t - (W-M)]
(A20)
-W)=q/(i-Q)=l/[½s-(R-W)J
The expected residuals are
p (W -M)= (W-M)]=l/2A
(A2l)
-W)= (R
-Wfl=l/2X0
Inserting(A20) and (A21) in (Al6) and solving yields
We =[½(t-2s)+(M+2R)J/3
(A22)
W =[½(2t—s)+(2M+Rfl/3
andsolvingfor the joint optimum, (A6), we get
(A23) W =[½(t-s)+(M+R)}/2+ -60- +
Whenthe random components r and 0 have the same dispersion, the
employer and the employee share equally in the returns to the joint
investment [(W =R+ R)].Since in this case the gains
[i.t(W -M)+ - W)}are constant and independent of the wage rate,
the way to maximize the expected joint gains G is to minimize separation
rates (i.e., maximize (1 -F)(l-Q)J.Hence, when, for example, the
variance of r increases (i.e., t increases), the increase in the risk
of being fired due to a marginal change in wages(Ar) declines.
Consequently, the optimum wage will be higher. Similarly, an increase in
the variance of 0 (i.e., an increase in s) results in qi4t rates being
less sensitive to changes in the wage and reduce the employee's share in
total returns (i.e., reduce W).
The gains to each side and jig)arenaturally not constant
and depend on W. The turnover rate is only one of the factors affecting
the decision of the maximizing individual (or firm). Not surprisingly,
the individual optimum (A22) differs from the joint optimum (A23). It
can easily be shown that the wage desired by the employee exceeds the
joint optimum, which in turn exceeds the wage desired by the employer
(W >W>W),where
(A24) Ww_W=W_We=[½(t+s)+(M_R)]/6>0•- 61-
TableAl. The Simultaneoue Determination of Hourly Earnings., Labor Force Separation,
.0.47 0.25
LHE . LSP
Males M-Fdifference Males M-Fdifference
b t. b t..b t b t
4.6417
0.0289
0.0137
-0.0002
0.020 1
-0. 0004
0.0439
-0. 0035
59.41
6.82
5.64
4. 39,
5.26
3.30
3.17
2.35
-0. 0352 1.39 1.1035
- 0.0102
- -0.0080
- 0.0003
- 0.0000
- 0.0001
2.61
2.96
5.28
2.85
3.94
7.66
0.00
1.47
-0. 0634
0. 0524
-0. 0068
-0. 0 122 0.0092 1.78
Constant
Sc
EX
EX2
TE
TE2
TJ
TJ2
AGE
TO
0c2
Oc3
Oc
0c5
CH
cy
CN
FS
FM
FY
MS
GV
UM
HI
RG
RC
LHE
LSP
0.99
0.95
3.54
4.21
14.64
3.59
2.63
2.44
1.89
2.66
3.38
0.55
1.52
2.32 0.0123 3.22 -0.0037
-0.0063 0.31 0.1071
-0.0028 .1.43-0.0122
-0.0264 1.49 0.3863
0.0307 '0.76 0.1921
-0.0225 '0.74' 0.1183
0.0058
.0.39 ,0.0532
-0.0079 0.54 0.0343
-0.0538 1.54 0.0104
'
0.38 0.0922
0.0874 2.66 0.0385 2.27-0.0847
-0.0748 2.09 0.0265 1.73 -
- - 0.0491 2.34 -
0.0807 2.75-0.0120 0.78-0.0121
—0.1291 3.87-0.0109 0.65-0.0357
-0.1915 4.62
0.0736
-0. 0333
0. 3256
-0.0817
-0.1553
0.0087
2.72
1.46
15.07
2.97
7.57
0.31
OJT 0.6857 7.33
RQT 0.1722 9.23- 62-
On-the-JobTraining, and Job Requirenienta--Miee and Femaiee (Constrained Equations)
0.08 0.20
OJT RQT
•Males M-Fdifference .Males M-Fdifference
b t .b t b t b t
0.7432 13.31 0.0248 0.80 0.7421 1.68 —0.5617 2.90
0.0079 1.92 - - 0.1251 10.30 - —
-0.0013 0.87 - - 0.0339 6.92 -0.0191 3.05
-0.0010 0.67 - - 0.0340 6.54 -0.0245 2.57
-0.0120 3.18 -0.0013 0.26
-0.0042 3.35
0.1781 1.32 -0.625 2.48
• -1.0015 7.48 0.0496 0.29
-0.5447 4.53 -0.5145 2.81
-1.0965 6.89 0.0007 0.00
0.0154 0.90 - -0.0197 0.19 0.0639 0.48
0.0228 1.38 - -0.0234 0.27 0.1915 1.51
-0.0364 2.07 - -0.4050 499 0.3243 2.38
0.0574 2.87-0.0266 0.91 0.1154 1.47 -0.1248 1.14
0.0781 2.98 -0.0264 0.79 -0.7414 9.01 0.7142 5.95
-0.1961 4.19 -2.0903 4.42 1.9727 3.88
-0.5268 1.10
0.0542 3.22+ -63- +
TableA2. The Decomposition of the Endogenous Variables
-
Women
fXf
Men
mXni mXf
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Hourly earnings (LHE)
Constant 4.6417 4.6417
Human capital 0.6580 0.7279 0.6956 0.6756
Control -0.0207 0.0272 0.0869 0.0152
OJT 0.4629 0.5087 0.5087 0.4629
RQT 0.1283 0.2919 0.2919 0.1283
Total 5.8068 6.1339 6.2247 5.9237
B. Labor force separation (LSP)
Constant 1.0683 1.0683 1.1035 1.1035
Human capital 0.1632 0.1545 0.1569 0.1750
Family -0.0326 -0.0231 0.0100 0.0073
Control 0.1937 0.2143 -0.0142 -0.0206
LHE —1.1102 -1.1882 -1.1882 -1.1102
Total 0.2824 0.2258 0.0680 0.1550
C. On-the-job training (OJT)
Constant 0.7680 0.7680 0.7432 0.7432
Human capital -0.1216 -0.1415 -0.1366 -0.1175
Control 0.0437 0.0367 0.0565 0.0654
LSP -0.0554 -0.0133 -0.0133 -0.0554
RQT 0.0404 0.0919 0.0919 0.0404
Total 0.6751 0.7418 0.7417 0.6761
D. Job requirements (RQT)
Constant 0.1744 0.1744 0.7421 0.7421
Human capital 1.7521 1.8207 2.3481 2.1183
Occupations -0.8389 -0.8368 -0.5249 -0.7456
Control 0.0460 0.0340 -0.3332 -0.2979
LSP -0.0332 -0.0079 -0.1413 -0.5905
OJT -0.3556 -0.3908 -0.3908 -0.3556
Total 0.7448 0.7936 1.6950 0.8708+ -64- +
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